

S-E-C-R-E-T  
IAC-M-39  
9 August 1951

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's  
Conference Room, Administration Building  
Central Intelligence Agency, on 9 August 1951

003  
12282

Director of Central Intelligence  
General Walter Bedell Smith  
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. W. Park Armstrong, Jr., Special Assistant, Intelligence,  
Department of State  
Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief  
of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army  
\*Rear Admiral Felix L. Johnson, Director of Naval Intelligence,  
Department of the Navy  
Major General Charles P. Cabell, Director of Intelligence,  
Headquarters, United States Air Force  
Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence,  
Atomic Energy Commission  
Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for  
Intelligence, The Joint Staff  
Mr. D. Milton Ladd, Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau  
of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

Mr. Frank G. Wisner, Central Intelligence Agency  
Dr. William L. Langer, Central Intelligence Agency  
[redacted] USA (Ret.), Central

Intelligence Agency

Mr. Sherman Kent, Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Ray Cline, Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

[redacted] Central Intelligence Agency

Mr. Mose Harvey, Department of State

Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army

Colonel Benjamin B. Talley, Department of the Army

Rear Admiral R. F. Stout, Department of the Navy

Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy

Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force

Colonel J. C. Marchant, Department of the Air Force

Lieut. Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force

James Q. Reber

Secretary

Intelligence Advisory Committee

S-E-C-R-E-T

Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the meeting of 2 August 1951 (IAC-M-38) were approved.

Enemy Capabilities for Attack  
on the United States

2. Action: The Service members of the IAC were requested to obtain, through such informal means as are appropriate, the advice and assistance of the Joint Staff Planners in developing the estimate of U. S. capabilities to repel attack (Item 3 b of IAC-M-38). It was noted that the estimates to be prepared by the IIC and the ICIS had been largely completed.

Consequences of the Signature  
of the Japanese Peace Treaty  
and a U. S.-Japanese Security  
Pact

3. Discussion: General Smith raised the question of the possibility of war upon the signature of the peace treaty with Japan and read a memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense requesting an estimate of Soviet reaction to the publication of the terms of the U.S.-Japanese security pact under three alternative time possibilities. Preliminary consideration of all sources of intelligence by the members led to the general conclusion that although Soviet capabilities were currently being enhanced at a rapid rate, no positive intention to resort to war at this time was discernible. It was believed that the timing of the announcement of the terms of the security pact would have no effect on a Soviet decision to go to war. In the preparation of the final statement, however, attention should be given to the possible psychological advantages accruing to the Soviets at the respective dates. The Secretary was directed to call Mr. Lovett's paper to the attention of Mr. Gray of the PSB for their information and action as appropriate.

Probability of an Early  
Assault on Japan

4. Action: It was agreed that the IAC representatives would meet on 9 August 1951 and revise the paper to take full account of the Watch Committee Report of 8 August and pertinent psychological factors. The resulting paper will be issued as a TOP SECRET SE with an indications annex, if appropriate.


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IAC-M-39 (Pg.1, Final)  
22 August 1951

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Fabrication and Duplication  
of Intelligence

5. Action: General Smith requested the members to give serious attention to the problem of fabrication and duplication in intelligence sources and the means of meeting the problem, taking into account  presentation of this problem in a particular area.



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